District Court Makes Another Ruling In Regional Airport Case
An aerial view of the land that might be impacted by a new regional airport. (Oskaloosa News file photo)
Washington County, Iowa – 8th Judicial District Court Judge Crystal Cronk has ruled in the latest legal wrangling taking place between the cities of Oskaloosa and Pella versus Mahaska County in regards to a proposed regional airport.
According to court documents, “Plaintiffs filed their Petition on August 22, 2017 seeking declaratory judgment and specific performance. Plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on January 19, 2018, which was granted on June 13, 2018. Plaintiffs then filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment on September 4, 2018, which Defendant resisted on September 19, 2018. Hearing was held on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on December 14, 2018. Plaintiffs appeared by counsel Jason Palmer and Benjamin Erickson. Defendant appeared by counsel Gary Dickey.”
The judge shared the findings of fact in the case stating, “FINDINGS OF FACT Pella, Oskaloosa, and Mahaska County formed the South Central Regional Airport Agency (SCRAA) for the purpose of constructing and operating a new regional airport. The parties entered in a 28E agreement previously deemed valid by this court. The Mahaska County Board of Supervisors passed a resolution on June 19, 2017, attempting to withdraw Mahaska County from the SCRAA and the agreement. Mahaska County also notified its SCRAA representative, Joe Warrick, that he no longer had a seat on the SCRAA board. Neither Pella nor Oskaloosa approved Mahaska County’s resolution as is required by Article XI of the agreement. Pella and Oskaloosa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting declaratory judgment that the 28E agreement was a valid contract, which this court granted on June 13, 2018. Additionally, this court found that Pella and Oskaloosa were entitled to pursue remedies stated in the 28E agreement, which includes specific performance. Mahaska County filed a Motion to Reconsider, Amend, and Enlarge Ruling, in which the court declined to make a more specific finding regarding remedies. The court also declined to make a finding on Mahaska County’s counterclaim stating that it “is not appropriate for summary judgment” and that Mahaska County “may take appropriate steps to pursue this claim.”
Cronk then outlined the case law she used for her ruling, and provided analysis for the ruling. “The court begins with Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant’s counterclaim must fail as a matter of law. It is the position of the Plaintiffs that they did not breach the 28E agreement, as the agreement does not prohibit the closure of roadways, nor did they require Mahaska County to actually close 220th Street. Further, Plaintiffs assert that Mahaska County cannot prevail on its claim because it has not presented proof of damages. In response, Mahaska County argues that Plaintiffs did require it to close 220th Street, and that this court’s ruling that summary judgment was not appropriate for the counterclaim preclude summary judgment here. In reviewing the record, the court finds there are genuine issues of fact making summary judgment inappropriate.
The court notes that the road at issue here has not been closed or relocated. It appears to be Mahaska County’s argument that the plan proposed by Plaintiffs effectively forces Mahaska County to close 220th Street. Plaintiffs argue that a service road will be created to accommodate agricultural vehicles and farm equipment. The question of whether the proposed plan actually forces Mahaska County to close or abandon 220th Street is a factual question reserved for the fact finder at trial. “Even if the facts are undisputed, summary judgment is not proper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences from them and thereby reach different conclusions.” Clinkscales v. Nelson Securities, Inc, 697 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Iowa 2005). Whether Plaintiffs are requiring road closure based upon the proposed plans is an issue that reasonable minds could draw different inferences from and reach different conclusions. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendant’s Counterclaim must be denied.
The court then turns to Plaintiffs’ request for a more detailed order regarding specific performance. As this issue is a matter of law and not a fact question, summary judgment is appropriate. When this court ruled on Plaintiffs’ first Motion for Summary Judgment, it determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance as a remedy for Defendant’s breach of contract, but declined to make specific findings. Plaintiffs now request the court order specific performance requiring Mahaska County comply with the Termination and Amendment Procedures of the 28E agreement, send its representative and participate in the SCRAA board meetings, and use best efforts to resolve issues regarding to road relocations.
Specifically, Plaintiffs’ request the court order Mahaska County to put road relocation complaints in writing and require Plaintiffs have at least 60 days in which to respond. Mahaska County argues Plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance because its nonperformance is excused due to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract. This argument is unpersuasive as this court already found Mahaska County to be in breach and specific performance a permissible remedy. Mahaska County’s argument is an indirect attack upon this court’s earlier ruling and is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. However, Mahaska County’s alternative argument that Plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance concerning the road relocations has merit. To be entitled to a contractual remedy, a party must prove that a contract exists and a breach has occurred. Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa 1998). The court’s ruling on the Plaintiffs’ first Motion for Summary Judgment found that Mahaska County has breached the 28E agreement by its repudiation resolution and removing its SCRAA representative. Specific performance is to “best effectuate the purposes for which a contract is made.” Lange, 520 N.W.2d at 117-118 (Iowa 1994). Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance regarding the provisions Mahaska County has been found to be in breach only.”
The Judge then ordered:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaim is denied.
2. Defendant Mahaska County must abide by the amendment and termination provisions of the 28E agreement between the parties, specifically embodied in Article XI of the agreement.
3. Defendant Mahaska County must allow its SCRAA representative attend and participate in good faith in the SCRAA meetings as needed.
